

### Appendix I

**Kenneth Bush. HANDS-ON PCIA: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Version: Sept 2004)**

A manual conceptualised to be reader-friendly and user-friendly, containing quick check-lists, diagrammes, examples, question-answer boxes, and worksheets. Please note that recent versions are always available directly from the author at: [kbush@ustpaul.ca](mailto:kbush@ustpaul.ca) or [kbush@iprolink.ch](mailto:kbush@iprolink.ch).

### Appendix II

**St. Paul University, MA in Conflict Studies, Faculty of Human Sciences**  
**ECS 5330: "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Interventions in Conflict-Prone Settings", Fall 2004**

Course outline and bibliography.

### Appendix III

**Univerisité Saint-Paul, Maîtrise des Arts, Études de Conflits, Faculté des sciences humaines.**

**ECS 5730 : Résolution des conflits: résultats et évaluation – « l'évaluation d'impact sur les situations de la paix et de conflit (EIPC) » Winter 2005**

Course outline and bibliography.

\* Disclaimer: The Berghof Handbook editorial team does not assume editorial responsibility for the content of the appendices.

# HANDS-ON



## PCIA

A Handbook for  
Peace And Conflict Impact Assessment  
(PCIA)

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In war zones, theory is either useful or useless. There is no middle ground. And there is rarely the luxury of time or space to mull over and contemplate abstractions, however erudite or elegant. If PCIA works for you, use it. If not, throw it out. We all have much more important things to do with our very limited and precious time. This much I can tell you: where PCIA has been used, and where it appears to have been successful, it was because PCIA was fully appropriated by communities themselves. They took it; they changed it; they used it so that it worked for them in their communities, in their realities. They certainly were not depending on some foreign white guy to tell them how to use *their own tool*.

Kenneth Bush, *Things I learned about PCIA in Habarana and Mindanao*

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"The main battlefield for good is not the open ground of the public area,  
but the small clearing in each heart."

-- Yann Martel, *The Life of Pi*

### *Acknowledgments*

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# I. INTRODUCTION

There are many tools to monitor and evaluate the *developmental* impacts of development projects, such as an irrigation project in eastern Sri Lanka, a health clinic in Bosnia or a education project in Gaza. We use indicators such as increased water access, agricultural production, public health, literacy, and so on. Yet, when a project is situated in a conflict-prone region, there are more than just developmental impacts to consider. Initiatives such as these affect, and are affected by, the dynamics of peace and conflict within such regions. At the moment, we can evaluate the developmental impact of an initiative, but we do not have the means of understanding or measuring peace and conflict impacts in a comprehensive or systematic way. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) is a response to this problem.

PCIA is a means of anticipating, monitoring, and evaluating the ways in which an intervention may affect or has affected the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region.

PCIA is a process, similar to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment, which helps identify and understand the impact of an initiative on peace or conflict. PCIA can be used in a broad range of conflict-prone settings, i.e. places where there is a risk that non-violent conflict may turn, or return, to violence. PCIA must be integrated into every stage of the project cycle - design, implementation and evaluation - if it is to help us in our work.

PCIA is an extremely important and useful process that will help you ensure that the initiatives you are working on do not aggravate violent conflict and, as far as possible, contribute to building peace within and between communities.

## *How is this hand-book organized?*

This handbook is a "hands-on," working, document which seeks to be practical and applicable. As a perpetual "work in progress", it is also a "working document" to be used and modified by users' to suit the particular needs -- as long as changes are true to the guiding principles outlined in the text, and are shared using the feedback mechanism noted below. In an effort to be reader-friendly, the handbook follows a "PCIA for Dummies" format, using quick checklists, question-answer sections, and illustrative tables, diagrammes, and so on. In an effort to be user-friendly, the handbook includes "Worksheets" that may be used (1) in the Capacity Building Exercise (the *Tugal Case Study*) prepared to complement the current document, and (2) in other cases of the user's choice.

## *How to use this Handbook*

This Handbook is organized into two parts:

- **Part I** consists of a handbook which introduces the idea of PCIA and tools for conducting one.

## Real Life Experiences

-- a cautionary tale --

One day, a development agency from a rich developed country decided that it would like to help rebuild water tanks in a war-affected country. The water reservoirs broke down long ago, but had never been repaired because of 20 years of war. However, peace talks had created an opportunity to do some much needed development work in areas that it had not been able to reach during the war.

So, following its usual rules, the development agency did what it always does: it asked interested companies to send in proposals to rebuild a particular tank in a rebel-controlled area. After reviewing all of the proposals, the agency chose the lowest bid -- which was half the price of any other bid. Eight months later, the agency received an report to let them know that the project had been completed according to the original proposal. The company was paid in full, and the agency was happy in the belief that it had completed a cost-effective water project that would benefit the local community. However, when rainy season arrived the "rebuilt" tank completely fell apart! What happened?


The company which won the bid was controlled by the main rebel group. One of the reasons that it was able to "do" the work so cheaply was because the project used "volunteer" labour -- farmers who owned tractors were forced to donate their time and equipment, and villagers were forced to work for free. None of the labour costs in the project budget went to the labourers. (Hmm, I wonder where this money went?) Furthermore, the tank did not follow the technical plan in the proposal. It did not include the water-proof skirt needed to make sure the tank held water! When the first engineer refused to give the project a passing grade, the rebels simply found another engineer who was more "agreeable."

In the end, contrary to the positive assessment of the development agency, the result of the project was: (1) a significant financial contribution to the rebels; (2) strengthening of the authoritarian control of rebels over civilians; (3) the abuse of the rights of labourers and children who were forced to work on the project; (4) no positive or sustainable developmental impact. In short, the project had negative developmental and peacebuilding impacts.

Did this project *really* take place? Yes, it did. *Maybe a pre-project PCIA might have helped?*

- **Part II** consists of a facilitator's manual for holding a capacity building workshop which applies the material in Part I to actual initiatives and programmes chosen in advance of the workshop by participants from their own areas of work.

This Handbook is written for all individuals and organizations that are working, or are planning to work, in countries, regions, or communities that may be affected by violent conflict. It has been designed to increase your capacity to undertake an assessment that: (i) identifies and assesses the ways in which the peace and conflict environment may affect an initiative or project; and (ii) identifies and assesses the ways in which an initiative or project may affect the peace and conflict environment.



We hope you find this Handbook and the process of using PCIA useful, and that it makes a positive contribution to the ways you understand and undertake your work.

### **Feedback mechanism**

The version of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment contained in this handbook is the product of many ongoing conversations. It is neither the first, nor the last, version of PCIA. Its worth can be measured only according to its utility. To be useful, it needs to be adjustable to suit different needs, in different environments. Since the introduction of the term "PCIA" (Bush 1996, 1998), there have been a number of attempts to further develop and operationalize the concept. Unfortunately, these have tended to be compartmentalized efforts - where the work and lessons of one group may, or may not, be shared with others struggling with similar challenges. There is a pressing need to pull together all of these various efforts into a more participatory learning process. We would very much like to learn from your efforts to use and adapt this Handbook so that we can continue to: build a network of like-minded people and organizations; learn from relevant experiences; and prepare and share useful PCIA material. We welcome your comments and suggestions. Please send them to: Kenneth Bush ([kbush@iprolink.ch](mailto:kbush@iprolink.ch) or [kbush@ustpaul.ca](mailto:kbush@ustpaul.ca)) or Myn Garcia ([mgarcia@gsp.org.ph](mailto:mgarcia@gsp.org.ph))

## **II. THINGS TO KNOW BEFORE YOU START**

### **A Word about words**

**peace and conflict impact assessment ("PCIA")** is a means of assessing the ways in which an intervention may affect, or has affected, the dynamics of peace or conflict in a conflict-prone region. PCIA focuses on: 1) **Peacebuilding Impact** -- those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances that violent conflict will breakout, continue, or start again, and; 2) **Conflict-Creating Impact** -- those factors that increase the chances that conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence. (Bush 1998).


*PCIA is a process, not an add-on or a single-use "tool".*

**peacebuilding** consists of two inseparable parts: (1) the **construction of the structures of peace**, and (2) the **deconstruction of the structures of violence**. It is not about the imposition of solutions, but the creation of space within which indigenous actors can identify problems and formulate their own solutions.

**impact** refers to the actual effects of an intervention - both intended and unintended - on the lives of its "beneficiaries" and others *beyond the immediate outputs* (e.g., # of wells dug, # of people trained, people serviced, and so on). In popular usage, "effect" and "result" is sometimes used in stead of impact.

**conflict** is not necessarily negative or destructive. **Problems arise when non-violent conflict(s) violent turn (or return) violent**. The "surprise" about the violent conflict is not that it occurs, but that we watch it develop for so long, and do nothing about it -- e.g., the disintegration of governments and the rule of law, increasing abuses of human rights, the imposition of conflict-creating terms of trade or economic conditionalities, the acceptance of (or participation in) corrupt business practices, the selling of weapons to illegitimate and violent regimes, etc..

**development** is inevitably conflictual, destabilizing and subversive because it challenges existing political, economic, and social power structures that stop individuals and groups from attaining their full potential.



**Words that can – and should –be applied to peace and conflict impact assessment**

- Flexible
- Interpretive
- Consistent
- Long-term timeframe
- Appropriate
- Participatory
- Liberating
- Coherent
- Timely
- Independent
- Connected
- Accountable
- Balanced (external & internal resources)
- Trust-building
- Shared
- Commitment
- Learning Tool
- Action Oriented/ Change-inducing
- Multi-Layered Realities
- Empowering



**Words that should not apply to peace and conflict impact assessment**

- IN-Flexible
- Descriptive/ shallow
- Ad hoc/ One-time-only
- Short-term
- Irrelevant (to local needs)
- NON-Participatory
- Imprisoning
- IN-Coherent
- After-thought
- Biased
- DIS-Connected
- UN-Accountable
- UN-Balanced (external & internal resources)
- Trust-DESTROYING/ suspicion-creating
- Secretive
- Flavor-of-the-month
- Check list
- Bureaucratic requirement
- Externally-Imposed "Realities"
- DIS-empowering

**NB: Words in this handbook that are highlighted in blue are explained in the glossary found in the Handbook Appendix.**

**Where should you "do" PCIA?**

PCIA should certainly be embedded in initiatives located in "hot" war zones. However, they should also apply to initiatives in a far wider range of *conflict-prone* settings – that is, places where there is a risk that non-violent conflict may *turn (or return)* to violence. This includes areas:

- where the control over, or use of, territory or resources is disputed;
- where the socio-economic gap between groups is increasing; or
- where unemployment is rising while living standards and human security are declining.

In each of these examples, violence and bloodshed may not have occurred. However, the likelihood that violence may occur is significant – especially if the tools for resolving conflict non-violently are weak or absent (e.g., where the political and legal systems have collapsed or become corrupt). In these settings, PCIA is essential.

**When should you "do" PCIA?**

Ideally, PCIA should be undertaken at all stages of a project, programme or initiative. However, as the table below illustrates, it may be used for different purposes at different stages.

*The different uses of PCIA at different phases of a project or initiative*

PHASE OF INITIATIVE OR PROJECT	How is PCIA used?	Objective	Tasks	
PRE-INITIATIVE	Planning Tool for Initiative Design, and Formulation	Anticipating/ "guesstimating" future impacts; "Building in" conflict prevention/ peacebuilding mechanisms	Risk and Opportunity Assessment (Worksheet I)	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Worksheet II)
IN-INITIATIVE	Performance Monitoring and Management tool	Monitoring Immediate Impacts	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Worksheet II)	On-Going Risk and Opportunity Assessment (Worksheet I)
POST-INITIATIVE	Strategic Planning for future phases	Evaluation, Institutional Learning	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Worksheet II)	



## Guiding Principles

- ☞ **PCIA is a process -- not a tool.** While some people would like a "PCIA Tool Kit" that can be applied everywhere to fix everything, PCIA will not make a difference unless it challenges *and changes* the way we do our work in conflict zones. *We may not have to do different work, but will have to do our work differently.* PCIA challenges us all to *fundamentally rethink* all of our work in areas prone to militarized violence
- ☞ **PCIA helps us to understand the specific rather than the general.** "We know a lot of things to be true about social violence, we just don't know when they will be true." (James Rule) PCIA help us to see, and to understand, when, why, and how a particular factor, in a particular situation, is likely to contribute to peace, or violent conflict. For example, many believe that poverty leads to violent conflict. However, when we look closely at different cases, we see that sometimes it appears related, and sometimes it does not. Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment helps to identify and understand when, why, and how poverty may contribute to violent conflict, for example, when a collective sense of injustice, indignity, and hopelessness is added to conditions of impoverishment. As importantly, PCIA helps us to make the changes to our initiatives to improve the likelihood that they achieve *both* their developmental impacts and peacebuilding impacts.
- ☞ **PCIA is not static.** PCIA is an on-going and dynamic approach taken before, during, and after a particular intervention in a conflict-prone region.
- ☞ **PCIA Needs to be transparent, shared, and People-Centred.** The real experts of PCIA are those women, men, girls and boys living in conflict zones. If they are not centrally involved in peace and conflict analysis and **interpretation**, then the exercise will fail, or worse, will **disempower** communities – that is, it will remove them from decisions that fundamentally affect their lives. If a community does not believe a PCIA is genuine or legitimate; if they believe that it is not in their interests; if they believe that it will be used for force unwanted initiatives or decisions on them; then they are completely justified in rejecting the process and its outcomes. **PCIA is too important to leave in the hands of so-called "experts."** As a colleague in Mindanao put it, "don't rely on documents, live in the community."
- ☞ **Building peace includes "un-building" the structures of violence.** Just as the removal of the structures of violence does not automatically bring peace, neither does the simple adding (or strengthening) of peace capacities automatically stop violence. For this reason, peacebuilders must strategically consider how to unbuild the structures of violence as well as to build the capacities for peace – other wise they risk seeing their hard work washed away in the next flood of violence.
- ☞ **Neither Development nor peacebuilding on their own will magically create peace.** Development and peacebuilding activities can make important positive contributions to peace and unity (or they can increase existing tensions). However, *on their own they will not create peace.* Full, genuine, and lasting peace requires substantive and on-going efforts by a wide range of actors (local, national, regional, international) in a broad range of activities (military, trade, development and humanitarian assistance, diplomatic, and so on)
- ☞ **Haste makes waste – PCIA takes time.** Despite the time pressures that always affect the planning and implementation of a project or initiative, there needs to be time for genuine dialogue, learning and capacity-building. A rushed PCIA is a doubtful PCIA.

### Real Life Experiences

— peacebuilding from one hand, guns and bombs from the other ---

A classic example of what not to do, is offered by a European development agency which decided that it wanted to "mainstream" PCIA into its work in Nepal in early 2002. Unfortunately, at the same time, the Prime Minister of that same European country announced that the Maoist insurgency *could be defeated militarily*. Accordingly, it increased *its military assistance ten-fold*. (the United States also increased its military assistance programme by the same proportion.) The Lesson: The most conflict-sensitive, peacebuilding-focused, development programming in the world is not going to magically erase the destructive impact of the further militarization of the conflict – although some people argue that military assistance is a form of peacebuilding. Indeed, in the example here, the Ministry of Defense had attempted to increase its military assistance to Nepal by drawing on a newly created Conflict Prevention Fund!

## Questions to ask about PCIA



### If development equals peace" why does conflict sometimes increase when a country or region "develops"?

#### How Development can Create Conflict

- By increasing socio-economic inequalities – or fueling the belief that such inequalities are increasing
- By benefiting certain groups more than others
- By increasing competition for development resources & political control
- By introducing new structures & institutions that challenge existing ones (social, political or economic)

If 'development equals peace,' then conflict should decrease as a country or region 'develops.' But this does not always happen. In fact, we often see that violence *increases* as the living conditions for some groups in a region improve. In many cases, development itself creates conflict. The critical issue is whether conflict created (or aggravated) by developmental interventions is dealt with violently or non-violently.

It is more accurate to say that development initiatives *sometimes* contribute to peace *and sometime contribute to conflict*. PCIA can help make sure that a project or initiative does not create violent conflict, and, as far as possible, makes a positive contribution to peace.



### How Can a development initiative have a peacebuilding or conflict-creating impact?

Imagine a municipal water project that seeks to improve access to clean water in an area where there have been tensions between communities.



We could say that this initiative has had a positive peacebuilding impact if

- it helped to bring members of the communities together because of their shared interest in clean water and the benefits this has for public health and general quality of life
- it created the communication channels and opportunities for diverse members of different communities to work together on issues beyond water management
- it increased inclusion and participation of both women and men from violence-affected groups in decision making at the community level on issues they consider a priority
- professional or interpersonal relationships began to grow across community lines and perhaps encouraged communities to work together in other areas of activity



That same water project could have a conflict-

creating impact if, for example, one community starts to think that the other community is benefiting more than its own -- or worse, if it believes that the other community will benefit by "stealing" its water. Or, conflict may be created (or worsened) if some members of the population are excluded from decision-making, participation, and so on (women, marginalized social, economic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural groups).

In order to identify and understand the peace or conflict impact of this example, we must ask questions that are different from the ones that usually get asked about the impact of initiatives. We need to know more than just the total number of "beneficiaries," or the increase in water access, or the decreased costs. PCIA helps us to change the ways we think about, carry out, and evaluate work in conflict-prone areas so that we can reinforce peacebuilding impacts and avoid the conflict-creating impacts.

#### TIP

##### Telling the Difference Between Development Indicators, Peace Indicators, and Conflict Indicators

Participants often mistake development indicators for peace or conflict indicators. While it is important to learn from mistakes, this may take up limited workshop time. In order to clarify the differences between different types of indicators, the following examples might be used:

##### Example 1: Water Project in a Conflict-Prone Setting

- **Development indicator:** Increased number of hectares under irrigation
- **Conflict Indicator:** Number of conflicts over water distribution
- **Peace indicator:** Number of cooperative relationships between farmers of different ethnic/religious groups OR increased levels of involvement in joint management of the project

##### Example 2: Health Project in a Conflict-Prone Setting

- **Health/development indicator:** Change in prevalence of disease
- **Conflict Indicator:** Conflict over access to new health services
- **Peace indicator:** level of support within conflicted communities for non-partisan health services OR degree to which staff reflects (or is accepted by) all communities and sub-groups.

Participants might then be asked to offer similar examples of the three different types of indicators



## How should we integrate peace and conflict issues into our work in conflict-prone areas?

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment is different from the way planning, monitoring, and "evaluation" is usually done, because it focuses on impacts far beyond the *stated* outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives of an initiative or programme. It looks for impacts on the peace and conflict environment – *in areas that an initiative may not have been designed to affect*. We need to "read between the lines" of what is happening or has happened.

PCIA tries to learn from the successes and failures of efforts to "mainstream" gender and environment into our work. Until we developed the tools to see and to measure the impact of our development work on women, girls and the environment, all we had were short, disconnected, stories of how a particular intervention seemed to have an impact. *We did not have the full story; we did not have a larger understanding* that could help those of us working in the field. For example, someone might have a story of how an initiative *increased* household access to clean water, but *removed* the opportunity for women to socialize, mobilize, and organize around the community well. Someone else, might mention the story of how the introduction of a tractor into to a community *increased production*, but removed women from their traditional role as cultivators and *reduced their economic independence*.

PCIA also collects and learns lessons from the stories told by those working "on the ground" in conflict-prone areas. For example: the story about parents burning down a new village school because rebels were using it to forcibly recruit children; or the story of how the negotiations between rebels and government to hold vaccination campaigns eventually created the personal relationships and space to negotiate longer ceasefires and peace talks. By listening to these stories, and learning from them, it is possible to develop and apply the analytical and programming tools necessary to make sure our work in conflict-prone areas contributes to peace, not war.

... [there is] the story about the burning down of a new school by parents themselves because rebels were using it to forcibly recruit children [and]

there is the story of how rebels and governments negotiate the holding the National Immunization Days

### Real Life Experiences

#### HOW NOT TO DO PCIA – creating conflict in the name of peace

In one war-affected country, so-called "PCIA workshops" were held both in rebel-controlled and Government-controlled areas. By most accounts, they were disorganized, confused and ill-prepared. They were led by foreigners who knew next to nothing about the conflict, very little about PCIA, and absolutely nothing about the intense sensitivities around "peace" at the time of the workshops -- which were held as very delicate peace talks were taking place inside and outside the country. The facilitators were unable to respond to questions about the specific relevance of PCIA to the on-going peace process (questions that should have been expected, since PCIA had been a part of a three-year consultation between government, donors, and civil society). Aside from the confused content and process of the workshops, documents were written in academic English and not translated into local languages. On-site interpretation was inadequate. All of these factors combined to ensure the frustration of participants and the failure of the exercise. Ironically, the net impact of workshops may have been to decrease the opportunity to strengthen PCIA capacity. Despite this dismal impact, a second round of workshops will apparently be held.

The inclusion of peace and conflict concerns into our development thinking requires tools that may be applied to *all activities in conflict-prone areas*, from service projects in education, agriculture, water, communications, and health, to commercial activities, to more openly political initiatives in peacebuilding, "good governance," and human rights.




## Don't we already "do" PCIA under the name of "Risk Assessment"?

The diagramme below shows the differences between "Risk Assessment" and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Risk Assessment focuses on how a conflict might get in the way of a project or initiative – making it less effective than it could be, or worse, a complete failure. In some cases, Risk Assessment looks for new opportunities in the local and national environments that might help an initiative meet its objectives. The central point of reference in Risk Assessment is the stated *developmental* objectives of an initiative (such as the improved health in an area through delivery of a health programme, increased mobility through the building of a road, increased agricultural production

through training and technical inputs.) Risk Assessments basically ask the questions: "Is this initiative possible within the current conflict, and what can I do to reduce the risk of failure caused by that conflict?" **PCIA, on the other hand, includes Risk Assessment, but looks beyond the stated objectives of an initiative to ask: "How might (or has) this initiative create conflict or build peace -- directly and indirectly – and what changes might be made to ensure sustainable positive impact and minimize negative impact?"**

## COMPARISON OF RISK ASSESSMENT AND PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT



### III. PCIA IN PRACTICE

Now that you have learned about PCIA and its underlying principles, you are ready to begin the five step process involved in using PCIA

#### I : Mapping & Risk and Opportunity Assessment

- **STEP 1** Assessing the environment – peace & conflict mapping
- **STEP 2:** Completing a risk and opportunity assessment

#### II : PCIA

- **STEP 3: PRE-INITIATIVE** -- Assessing potential peace and conflict impacts during the design process
- **STEP 4: IN-INITIATIVE** -- Assessing peace and conflict impacts during implementation
- **STEP 5: POST-INITIATIVE** -- Assessing peace and conflict impacts as part of post-initiative evaluation

### Real Life Experiences

#### When does a kidney transplant have a peacebuilding impact?

Secret peace talks were being delayed by the poor health of the leading ideologue and negotiator for the main rebel group in Sri Lanka. He was unable to endure the long meetings required to work out the details of a possible peace process. The waiting list for a kidney transplant in the UK, where he was living, was very long. The Norwegian Government, who had been quietly supporting the peace process, stepped in and arranged for him to have the necessary surgery. As a result, the negotiator was able to fully participate in the secret peace process which subsequently became a public peace process.

## STEP 1

### Assessing the Environment

The first step is to look at the environment with which you are dealing and establish whether it is conflict-prone. There are two important reasons why you need to be able to tell whether or not an area is conflict-prone:

- 1) *PCIA is required only in conflict-prone areas:* it would be burdensome, unnecessary and possibly counter-productive to apply PCIA to every project, program or initiative. The ability to tell the difference between a conflict-prone and a non-conflict-prone area (or more and less conflict-prone areas) allows you to decide when and where PCIA is necessary.
- 2) *Different types of conflicts have different patterns, intensities, and impacts.* The ability to analyze conflicts is essential for anticipating and responding to possible impacts on a project or initiative.

#### How to tell you are in conflict-prone setting – before it is too late

<p>✓</p> <p>taking place, or has taken place (conflict zones, post-conflict settings, transitional settings)</p> <p>(such as: water, agricultural land, and fish; grazing lands; access to education, public employment, or housing)</p> <p>management and resolution mechanisms</p>	<p>the right to have, govern, or use the same piece of land</p> <p>over the allocation of the benefits of newly discovered resources (oil, diamonds, strategic minerals, etc.)</p> <p>tensions (e.g., workers vs plantation owners; labourers vs land owners; unemployed vs corrupt government officials)</p>	<p>that they have been "wronged" or exploited, and, possibly, the presence of a leader who is trying to use this feeling to fight for "justice." Or, the absence of a leader able to harness dissent constructively.</p>
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**If you are working, or plan to work, in areas affected by these tensions, then PCIA should be used, and you should undertake a collective mapping exercise of the peace and conflict environment using the following worksheets.**





**STEP 2**

## Completing a Risk and Opportunity Assessment

Now that you have determined that a location is conflict-prone, the second step is to undertake a Risk and Opportunity Assessment. This will help you to better understand how the peace and conflict environment may affect a project or initiative.

Before starting an initiative or project we need to decide whether it makes sense to try to work in a particular conflict environment, i.e., is there room to work in the area, or are the levels of violence too high and peace opportunities too low? Is the initiative appropriate – that is, does it have the right ingredients for success (personnel, operating procedures, peace and conflict sensitivities? What needs to be done to reduce the chance of failure of an initiative caused by conflict?) To answer these questions, we need to do a basic Risk and Opportunity Assessment of the ways in which the conflict may hinder a proposed initiative and to determine whether (and how) existing or newly-emerging peace capacities and resources may help it.

While Risk and Opportunity Assessment needs to be undertaken before starting an initiative or project, it should be repeated throughout the life of an initiative. As a peace and conflict environment changes, and an initiative matures, it is important to return to these questions in order to monitor the on-going feasibility and appropriateness of the initiative. The worksheet below should help you to scan the peace and conflict environment in a systematic fashion, so that you may identify the risks and opportunities that may affect the success of your project/initiative.

<b>WORK SHEET # 1</b> RISK AND OPPORTUNITY ASSESSMENT					
ISSUE AREA (Where to look)	RISK & OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS (What to look at)				
<b>1.1 LOCATION</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Geographical extent of the initiative (where are the boundaries between areas of more violence &amp; areas of less violence, &amp; where is the initiative located within this geography of violence?)</li> <li>• Status of territory where initiative is located (Ambiguous? Contested? Newly accessible?)</li> <li>• Level of Infrastructure &amp; accessibility (Roads &amp; transport? Water? Electricity? Housing?)</li> </ul>				
	<p>What are the possible Impacts of the location on the proposed project/ initiative?            What is happening in the peace and conflict environment (<u>related to location</u>) that may affect the project/ initiative?</p>				
	<table border="1" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center; color: red;"><b>RISKS</b></td> <td style="width: 50%; text-align: center; color: green;"><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="height: 150px;"></td> <td style="height: 150px;"></td> </tr> </table>	<b>RISKS</b>	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>		
	<b>RISKS</b>	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>			
<p>Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p>					
<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?</p>					



timing/ 1.2

<p><b>ISSUE AREA</b> (Where to look)</p>	<p><b>RISK &amp; OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS</b> (What to look at)</p>	
<p><b>1.2 TIMING</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Current stage of the conflict (in the context of the history of the conflict – Stalemate? Escalating? "Paused"?)</li> <li>• Current or future political, economic, social-cultural developments that might affect the initiative (e.g., trade agreements, changes to commodity prices, elections, arrival/departure of military forces, changes in size/composition of local populations)</li> <li>• Increasing or decreasing opportunities to work in the area? (Are others working in/or leaving the area? If so, why?)</li> </ul>	
	<p>How might the timing of the proposed project/ initiative, affect its chances of success? What is happening in the peace and environment (<u>related to timing</u>) that may affect the project/ initiative?</p>	
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p>
	<p>Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p>	
	<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?</p>	



political context/ 1.3

<b>ISSUE AREA</b> (Where to look)	<b>RISK &amp; OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS</b> (What to look at)	
<b>1.3 POLITICAL CONTEXT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relationship between local communities, political, and military authorities? (cooperative? Difficult? Distrustful? Conflict-creating. Who are the allies, "enemies," scapegoats, beneficiaries, ignored? How will this affect the initiative?</li> <li>Level of political support for the initiative/ project locally, regionally, nationally?</li> <li>Predictability (or stability) of the political, legal, &amp; security environments?</li> <li>Presence or absence of peace initiatives (formal &amp; informal/ local &amp; national) Are they inclusive? If not what are the major omissions?</li> <li>Nature of the political system &amp; possible impact on initiative. Are leaders' accountability? What are the levels and patterns of corruption? How is force/fear used politically (e.g., against women, opponents, and marginalized groups)? Are politically, economically, or socially sensitive issues affected by the initiative?</li> <li>External conditions (Structural Adjustment Programmes; Poverty Alleviation Programmes, "Wars on Terror"; Trade or Defence Treaties)</li> </ul>	
	How might the changing political context (environment) affect the proposed project/ initiative? What is happening <u>politically</u> that may help or hurt the project/ initiative?	
	<b>RISKS</b>	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>
	Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?	
	What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?	





# military context/ 1.4

<b>1.4 MILITARY CONTEXT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Relationship between armed actors (e.g., feuding within &amp; between armed groups? Black market cooperation?)</li> <li>Intensity, targets, &amp; patterns of violence in initiative/project area? (How might this affect the initiative?) How might it affect male and female beneficiaries?)</li> </ul>	
	<p>What is the possible Impact of militarized conflict on the proposed project/ initiative?            What is happening in the peace and conflict environment <u>militarily</u> that may affect the project/ initiative?</p>	
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p>
	<p>Is information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p>	
	<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?</p>	



ISSUE AREA (Where to look)	RISK & OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS (What to look at)	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>1.5 SOCIO ECONOMIC ISSUES</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legacies of conflict in the area (physical security? Fear? War economy? Food security? Infrastructure? Inter-group relations? Health? Psycho-social trauma? Changes in family dynamics? Relations between and within main communities in initiative site (Cooperative? Inter-dependent? Competitive?) What are the dynamics within these relationships – e.g., gender, religious, cultural, economic, etc.?</li> <li>• Cultural factors that may affect the initiative (fear of external control; politicized rejection of "Western" or particular "religious" values; gender roles)</li> <li>• Economic relations within the initiative site (mutually dependent? Competitive? Corrupt? exploitative? Growing? Shrinking? War-dependent? )</li> <li>• Impact of conflict on local resources (resourcefulness &amp; creativity; leadership capacities; enterprising spirit; hope; gender equity in tapping human resources)</li> </ul>	
	<p>What socio-economic factors might affect on proposed project/ initiative? How? What is happening in the peace and conflict environment <u>socio-economically</u> that may affect the project/ initiative? Are there any exclusionary barriers that prevent inclusion and participation of certain category of populations?</p>	
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p>
	<p>Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p>	
<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?</p>		



<p><b>1.6 PARTNERS/ STAKE- HOLDERS</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Capacity of implementing organization, including qualified &amp; suitable staff</li> <li>• Involvement of implementing organization in conflict or peace processes; &amp; its "political" position or acceptability within the area of the initiative</li> <li>• Choice of "beneficiaries": the political implications, inclusion of marginalized members of the community. Are there any gender disparities?</li> <li>• Conditions for effective implementation (leadership; coordination; access; trust; technical capacities; gender sensitivity</li> <li>• Ability of stakeholders to make choices &amp; willingness to make changes. Are there any exclusionary barriers negatively affecting the ability of male and /or female beneficiaries to participate?</li> </ul>	
	<p>Is the project/ initiative appropriate (structure, objectives, process, etcetera)? What is happening in the peace and conflict environment that may affect the ability of partners or stakeholders to complete the project/ initiative successfully?</p>	
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p>
	<p>Is there more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p>	
<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?</p>		

other factors/ 1.7

ISSUE AREA (Where to look)	RISK & OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS (What to look at)	
1.7 OTHER FACTORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since every initiative location is unique, there are probably other factors that may affect it .</li> </ul>	
	Are there any other factors that might affect the project or initiative? How might they help or hurt?	
	<b>RISKS</b>	<b>OPPORTUNITIES</b>
	Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?	
What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start or continue the initiative?		



**Example from "Tugal" Capacity Building Exercise (See Parts II & III)**  
**(A Basic Needs Project undertaken by the National Association of Farmers (NAF))**

EXAMPLE

ISSUE AREA (Where to look)	RISK & OPPORTUNITY INDICATORS (What to look at)		
SOCIO ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legacies of conflict in the area (physical security? Fear? War economy? Food security? Infrastructure? Inter-group relations? Health? Psycho-social trauma)</li> <li>Relations between main communities in project site (Cooperative? Inter-dependent? Competitive?)</li> <li>Cultural factors that may affect the initiative (fear of external control; politicized rejection of "Western" or particular "religious" values)</li> <li>Economic relations within the initiative site (mutually dependent? Competitive? Corrupt? exploitative? Growing? Shrinking? War-dependent?)</li> <li>Impact of conflict on local resources (resourcefulness &amp; creativity; leadership capacities; enterprising spirit; hope)</li> </ul>		
	<p>What socio-economic factors might affect on proposed project/ initiative? How?            What is happening in the peace and conflict environment <u>socio-economically</u> that may affect the project/ initiative?</p>		?
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Socio-Economic Environment may be, or may become too unstable to sustain initiative</li> <li>- Legacy of distrust/ silence may inhibit community participation; "Social infrastructure" (trust, willingness to participate, communication channels, etc.) may not be ready for the initiative</li> <li>- the rebels may not be interested in giving up governance by force for more democratic and participatory forms of governance</li> <li>- Rebels may to take control of the initiative</li> <li>- Black market forces and mafia may inhibit initiative</li> <li>- insufficient local resources for the initiative</li> </ul>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Returnees may bring useful resources for the initiative (skills, understandings, etc..)</li> <li>- If all communities are equally affected by the war, then common needs might encourage common interests to support initiative activities</li> <li>- Neighbouring Country of Sylvania may be a source of additional resources for reconstruction</li> <li>- post-war optimism (by communities and political actors) may give the initiative an initial boost</li> </ul>	
	<p>Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How high are levels of corruption and extortion? How do other development initiatives deal with this?</li> <li>- Who within the Rebel Groups and within community groups are representative leaders that the initiative can work with/ through? Who are natural allies and peace advocates? [Source of info: field trips, consultation]</li> <li>- How open will the communities be to this initiative? [Source of info: field trips, consultation]</li> <li>- how will oil and mineral development affect the initiative? [Source of info: focused participatory study]</li> </ul>		?
<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start the initiative?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Initiative may need to build in space and time for trust-building among partners. Draft plan for doing so</li> <li>- Initiative should formulate very specific responses to possible negative developments (war escalation; attempts to extort resources from the initiative; instances of intimidation; etc)</li> </ul>		?	

EXAMPLE

<p><b>PARTNERS/ STAKEHOLDERS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Capacity of implementing organization, including qualified &amp; suitable staff</li> <li>Involvement of implementing organization in conflict or peace processes: &amp; its "political" position or acceptability within the area of the initiative</li> <li>Choice of "beneficiaries" &amp; the political implications</li> <li>Conditions for effective implementation (leadership; coordination; access; trust; technical capacities)</li> <li>Ability of stakeholders to make choices &amp; willingness to make changes</li> </ul>	<p>Is the project/ initiative appropriate (structure, objectives, process, etcetera)? What is happening in the peace and conflict environment that may affect the ability of partners or stakeholders to complete the project/ initiative successfully?</p>	?	
	<p><b>RISKS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Security risks to employees and partners</li> <li>- Lack of suitable employees; unwillingness of people to work in the East</li> <li>- Lack of experience working in post-conflict settings</li> <li>- Tensions with the Central Govt in Western Province</li> <li>- lack of participation, or interference, by rebels</li> <li>- May generate tensions between returnees and those who remained in the East</li> </ul>	<p><b>OPPORTUNITIES</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NAF (project implementers) familiar with the project site</li> <li>- NAF has good reputation with local pop'n</li> <li>- Arrival of other development actors opens possibility of collaboration and mutual support</li> </ul>	
	<p>Is there more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How will the initiative monitor Risks and Opportunities throughout its life, for example, security risks?</li> <li>- How will beneficiaries be chosen?</li> <li>- What will be the hiring policies, esp. regarding ethnic/ gender composition?</li> <li>- Will there be a formal dispute management mechanism within the initiative to deal with tensions within the team, e.g., between "old" and "new guard"; between Muslims and Christians? Between NAF and local actors (individuals and orgs)?</li> </ul>		?
	<p>What changes or clarifications are needed before you would start the initiative?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Clarity on the above questions, and specific plan for managing these risks and opportunities throughout the life of the initiative</li> </ul>		?

**STEPS 3, 4 and 5**

Having analysed ways in which the peace or conflict environment might affect a proposed initiative, the next task is to assess how the proposed initiative may affect peace or conflict both in the immediate area in which it will be working and beyond.

The key to a successful PCIA is ensuring it is applied at every stage of the project cycle. Worksheet 2 (below) will help you through Steps 3, 4 and 5. You will notice that each step involves similar activities, but are done at different stages of an initiative:

**Step 3: Pre-initiative PCIA.** This step involves looking for the potential peace and/ or conflict impact of an initiative before an initiative begins, during the design and planning stage. Use the *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* worksheet provided below to guide you through completing a comprehensive pre-initiative PCIA.

**Step 4: In-initiative PCIA.** This step involves looking for peace and/ or conflict impact while an initiative is underway, during initiative implementation. At this stage you are monitoring immediate impacts, both formally and informally, and making changes to initiative design and direction as necessary. Use the *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* worksheet provided below to guide you through completing a comprehensive in-initiative PCIA

**Step 5: Post-initiative PCIA.** The fifth step involves looking for the peace and/ or conflict impact after an initiative has been completed. PCIA should be integrated into formal initiative evaluations, though an assessment can be done outside of the evaluation process as well. Use the *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* worksheet provided below to guide you through completing a comprehensive post-initiative PCIA.

**TIP:** Before jumping into these crucial steps of PCIA, you may wish to review the table found following Worksheet #2, entitled "Where to Look for Peace and Conflict Impact," to make sure that we all share the same understanding of the words and terms used in the Worksheet. The table:

- (1) provides examples of peace impacts and conflict impacts drawn from "real life" examples; and
- (2) suggests some sample indicators of peace and conflict impact.

## TIP

### Telling the Difference Between:

- **Development Indicators**
- **Peace Indicators, and**
- **Conflict Indicators**

Participants often mistake development indicators for peace or conflict indicators. While it is important to learn from mistakes, this may take up limited workshop time. In order to clarify the differences between different types of indicators, the following examples might be used:

### Example 1 : Water Project in a Conflict-Prone Setting

- **Development indicator:** Increased number of hectares under irrigation
- **Conflict Indicator:** Number of conflicts over water distribution
- **Peace indicator:** Number of cooperative relationships between farmers of different ethnic/religious groups OR increased levels of involvement in joint management of the project

### Example 2: Health Initiative in a Conflict-Prone Setting

- **Health/development indicator:** Change in prevalence of disease
- **Conflict Indicator:** Conflict over access to new health services
- **Peace indicator:** level of support within conflicted communities for non-partisan health services OR degree to which staff reflects all communities and sub-groups.

Participants might then be asked to offer similar examples of the three different types of indicators

## WORK SHEET # 2

### PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT

PRE-INITIATIVE, IN-INITIATIVE, POST-INITIATIVE

#### AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT

#### 2.1 Conflict Management Capacities



Capacity of state *or* civil society: (1) to manage or resolve conflict without the use (or threat) of violence, and without supporting authorities that use unlawful violence; and (2) to promote genuine and sustainable peace

Impact on capacity to identify and respond to peacebuilding opportunities and conflict-creating challenges. This might include formal instruments (such as strengthening legal mechanisms or creating dispute resolution boards) or more informal mechanisms (such as low-key meetings, community leader interventions, creating channels for local level dialogue, tapping the peacebuilding abilities of neglected segments in the community such as women).

Conflict management capacities might include:

- 1) the ability to *think about and identify* peacebuilding challenges and opportunities;
- 2) the ability of organizations to *restructure themselves* to respond peacebuilding challenges and opportunities; and
- 3) to *change how they normally work* so that they can respond more effectively and efficiently in ways that have a hard, positive, peacebuilding impact on the ground - for example, in ways that improve fairness, equity (including gender equity), "even-handedness," accountability, and transparency.

#### Sample Questions

- Did/does/may the initiative help – or hinder -- individuals or groups (with civil society, the state, or the private sector) to identify and respond to peacebuilding opportunities and conflict –creating challenges? Who did/does/may this affect? How did/does/may it affect them – and why? Did/does/may the initiative increase or decrease the ability to imagine, describe and create options that nurture peace?
- What were/are/might be the obstacles to a positive peacebuilding impact?
- How were/are/might the beneficial impacts be increased and made more sustainable both during and following the initiative.?



#### Peace Impact (potential or actual)

#### INDICATORS?

Qualitative/ Quantitative

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#### Conflict Impact (potential or actual)

#### INDICATORS?

Qualitative/ Quantitative

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- (1) Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?
- (2) What changes would you make to the initiative to increase its peacebuilding impact and decrease conflict-creating impact?

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT	
<p><b>2.2 Militarized Violence &amp; Human Security</b></p>	<p>Direct and indirect impact on (1) patterns and levels of violence by militarised forces; and (2) an individual's and community's sense of security or insecurity -- including physical and mental well-being and sense of individual or group identity.</p> <p>"Patterns of Violence": Different groups in society experience different levels (and types) of violence and therefore have different levels of insecurity and vulnerability, <i>e.g.</i>, women, children, minority groups, marginalized groups, and returnees and other marginalized groups.</p> <p>"Militarised forces" may include national armed forces, rebels, paramilitaries, war lords, militias, bandits, organized crime rings, vigilante groups, police – when they use military weapons, structures, and tactics.</p> <p>"Community" includes both resident populations and returning populations</p>
	<p><i>Sample Questions</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Did/does/may the initiative or project affect the individual's sense of security, positively or negatively?</li> <li>✓ Did/does/may the initiative affect the military/paramilitary/criminal environment - directly or indirectly, positively or negatively? If so how?</li> <li>✓ Will there be/ was there real improvements in the political, economic, physical, food, security among women and men? If so, what are they? Who will benefit; and who will <i>not</i> benefit from improvements? Will this create conflict? How can benefits be more broadly or more fairly distributed?</li> <li>✓ Did/does/may the initiative deepen our understanding, or increase the ability to deal with non-military causes violent conflict - <i>e.g.</i>, environmental degradation, resources scarcity, political manipulation, disinformation, mobilization and politicization of identity, etc.?</li> </ul>
	<p><b>Peace Impact (potential or actual)</b></p>
	<p><b>INDICATORS?</b> Qualitative/ Quantitative</p> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
	<p><b>Conflict Impact (potential or actual)</b></p>
	<p><b>INDICATORS?</b> Qualitative/ Quantitative</p> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>
<p>(1) Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?                  (2) What changes would you make to the initiative to increase its peacebuilding impact and decrease conflict-creating impact?</p>	



**AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT**

**2.4  
Economic  
Structures  
and  
Processes**



Impact on: strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures and processes; distortion/conversion of war economies; economic infrastructure; conflicts over access to scarce basic goods; availability of investment capital to create economic and employment alternatives to war-fighting; the stability of the banking system; increasing or decreasing the economic dependence on military (or military-related) employment; productivity and the equitable distribution of non-war/ peace benefits; training; income generation; production of commercial products or services; food in/security; the exploitation, generation, or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food security.

*Sample Questions*

Did/does/ may the initiative or project contribute to or detract from efforts to "re"-construct damaged economic and social infrastructure? Specifically:

- strengthening or weakening equitable socio-economic structures/processes;
- distortion/conversion of war economies;
- economic infrastructure;
- supply of scarce basic goods;
- availability of investment capital to create economic and employment alternatives to war-fighting for men and women;
- the stability of the banking system with equitable access to men and women;
- increasing or decreasing the economic dependence on military (or military-related) employment;
- productivity and the equitable distribution of non-war/ peace benefits; training; income generation;
- production of commercial products and services; food in/security;
- the exploitation, generation, or distribution of resources, esp. non-renewable resources and the material basis of economic sustenance or food security.

If the initiative or project addresses or affects the following, does it do so in a way that minimizes or avoids destabilization and conflict, while maximizing peacebuilding opportunities?

- high level of debt
- unsustainable high military budgets
- skewed distribution of wealth, income, and assets
- resettlement of displaced populations
- environmental degradation - particularly that which inhibits economic productivity
- damage assessment of social & economic infrastructure
- provide technical assistance for rehabilitation and reconstruction
- rehabilitate and reconstruct economic infrastructure
- reactivate smallholder agriculture with consideration of the role of women in the process
- rehabilitate the export sector
- rehabilitate key industries
- sharing the benefits of national wealth and resources?

**Peace Impact (potential or actual)**

**INDICATORS?**  
Qualitative/ Quantitative

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**Conflict Impact (potential or actual)**

**INDICATORS?**  
Qualitative/ Quantitative

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(1) Is more information needed? If so, what is it, and how do you get it?  
(2) What changes would you make to the initiative to increase its peacebuilding impact and decrease conflict-creating impact?





# worknotes





## WHERE TO LOOK FOR POTENTIAL PEACE OR CONFLICT IMPACT

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT		EXAMPLES		
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT	
1	Conflict Management Capacities	<p>(1) Gender-sensitive initiatives in conflict prone areas that hire, train, and keep local personnel—especially in administrative, technical, and management positions – are strengthening governance capacities which may be used in state &amp; societal institutions that deal with conflicts non-violently. Unfortunately, this is the technical and managerial capacity that flees when non-violent conflict turns (or re-turns) violent.</p> <p>(2) Efforts by many organizations (international, governmental, and non-governmental) to include conflict resolution and peacebuilding workshops (and increasingly, PCIA) into their daily work is a substantive contribution to the development of capacities for peace.</p> <p>(3) Initiatives that maintain effective "outreach," "public dialogue," or participatory activities help to keep stakeholders involved and build inter-group trust and understanding.</p> <p>(4) Initiatives to tap the peacebuilding abilities of women in activities that focus on conflict resolution, mediation, and community peace promotion and advocacy.</p>	<p>One of Kosovo's most experienced human rights activists who had been trained in Norway and Geneva had helped to establish a women's legal aid center in the 1990s. However, during the UN-driven reconstruction exercise she was reduced to a "local employee" of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to translate for international staff with a fraction of her experience. Officially, she was unable even to take testimony from victims. This reservoir of local talent should have been the centerpiece of the UN reconstruction strategy. However, because of the reliance on foreign "experts," the overall impact was a contribution to the <u>incapacity</u> -- rather than capacity -- of civil society to rebuild itself upon a foundation of tolerance and respect of its own creation. (Guest 2000)</p>	
		SAMPLE INDICATORS*		
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of conflicts in which gov'tal/ non-gov'tal bodies are involved as mediators, facilitators, negotiators, etc.</li> <li>• Perception of local mediators and aggrieved parties that conflict can be resolved without use of violence</li> <li>• Number conflict resolution workshops – and follow-up</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Differences in the impact of conflict on men and women;</li> <li>• # and types of interventions targeted to address both women and men considering the differences in the nature of conflict impact and priorities</li> <li>• Respect for process and outcomes of dispute settlement through public institutions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Belief in possibility of receiving fair treatment/ outcomes through public institutions</li> <li>• Perception that violence is not a legitimate or effective means of resolving conflict</li> <li>• Degree to which peace and conflict issues are considered in the formulation and operation of initiatives ("Do No Harm," PCIA, Conflict-Sensitive Programming, etc)</li> </ul>



(These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities)

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT		EXAMPLES			
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT		
2	Militarized Violence and Human Security	<p>(1) The inclusion of ex-combatants in peace and reconstruction work in both Nicaragua and parts of Mindanao were clear efforts to "deconstruct the structures of militarized violence" and to "construct the structures of peace."            (2) In many cases, the negotiations for humanitarian ceasefires (<i>e.g.</i>, for National Immunization Days) have opened up communication channels that have later contributed directly to longer cease fires and even peace talks—as in Sri Lanka. (Bush 2000). In Somalia, the demand from the local population that their children be immunized led local leaders to de-mine roads to permit access for vaccination teams. Orders were issued to combatants that no weapons were to be displayed on the days of the immunization campaigns. Such initiatives have dampened militarized violence and increased human security.</p>		<p>Working with, or through, groups which use illegitimate violence and abuse human rights – for example for the protection of convoys, compounds, and offices, or as middlemen for the provision of goods and services— is an obvious example of how an initiative can strengthen rule by force and violence (threatened and actual).</p>	
		<p><b>SAMPLE INDICATORS*</b></p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict-related deaths or injuries</li> <li>• Disappearances</li> <li>• Incidence of human rights abuses, including rape, sexual torture and violations of children's rights – and effectiveness of official responses to reports of such violations</li> <li>• Levels of domestic violence</li> <li>• Number of riots or other uncontrolled expressions of dissent</li> <li>• Demonstrations</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of displaced people</li> <li>• Rate and patterns of repatriation/ displacement</li> <li>• Arrests or detention without probable cause or warrant</li> <li>• Incommunicado detention</li> <li>• Cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment in detention</li> <li>• Inhumane conditions of detainment</li> <li>• Dependence on private security forces</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Perceptions of individual and collective security</li> <li>• Levels of criminality (effectiveness of state responses)</li> <li>• # of small arms in circulation (<i>e.g.</i>, black market price of an assault rifle)</li> <li>• Number of children, women and men involved in military activities</li> <li>• Level of food security</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflict-related deaths or injuries</li> <li>• Disappearances</li> <li>• Incidence of human rights abuses, including rape, sexual torture and violations of children's rights – and effectiveness of official responses to reports of such violations</li> <li>• Levels of domestic violence</li> <li>• Number of riots or other uncontrolled expressions of dissent</li> <li>• Demonstrations</li> </ul>
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(These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities)

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT		EXAMPLES	
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT
3	Political Structures and Processes	<p>(1) In the late 1990s, the Group for Environmental Monitoring in South Africa undertook a far-reaching participatory, applied research initiative on the linkages between "militarization and ecology." The positive peace impact was clear in (1) the word-for-word inclusion of its research and recommendations in government defense policy; and (2) the mobilization of non-English speaking peasants for the initiative enabled these groups to continue to express their concerns long after the initiative was finished, and to contribute to on-going dialogue with government on policies affecting their lives and livelihoods.</p> <p>(2) Sustained efforts by local groups in the southern Philippines to create Zones of Peace are inspirational examples of how the mobilization of ideas and people can begin to restructure the political and military structures to create peace from the ground up – even in the midst of on-going violence.</p>	<p>The decision to accept the cheapest bid to rebuild a water tank in a rebel-controlled area of Country X in 2002 produced a host conflict-creating impacts. Because the initiative was undertaken by a rebel-controlled front company, workers were forced to work for free, tractor owners were forced to donate the use of their equipment; and funds that should have gone to pay for labour, equipment and material, seem to have become a significant financial contribution to the rebels. The initiative reinforced the anti-democratic rule of the rebel group, and had a further negative <i>development</i> impact when the water tank was washed out during the rainy season.</p> <p>The imposition of "solutions" by outside actors to the benefit of the imposing power, and the impoverishment of the recipient communities. For example: the imposition of inappropriate "reforms" or "solutions" by a central govt in marginal or conflict-affected areas; the bankrupting of a country by conditions imposed by International Financial Institutions in countries (such as Argentina); or imperialistic invasions such as the war by G.W. Bush in Iraq.</p>
		<p><b>SAMPLE INDICATORS *</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom of speech/ media</li> <li>• Presence of multi-communal political parties/ business groups/ civil society orgs</li> <li>• Free and fair elections (levels of participation in elections)</li> </ul>	

(These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities)

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT		EXAMPLES	
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT
4	Economic Structures and Processes	<p>(1) In Ethiopia, in the mid-1990s, water projects improved access of displaced pastoralists to water, and thus reduced a major sources of conflict with local populations.</p> <p>(2) In Somalia in the early 1990s, shopkeepers and merchants were actually supporting violence and looting because their regular supplies of agricultural goods for their markets had been destroyed by the drought and clan conflict. In an attempt to resolve this problem, a development worker named Fred Cuny talked a number of a number of development agencies to implement programmes which involved selling food aid to these merchants on a regular basis at stable prices in order to reduce their dependence on looted supplies, and to return merchants to their traditional role as self-interested defenders of law and order seeking the stability necessary for normal commercial activity. The projects encouraged merchants to apply pressure on the militias to limit their disruption, and to cut off a source of funding to the militias who used the merchants' payments to purchase more weapons. (Source: Natsios 1997)</p>	<p>Uneven distribution of public resources (jobs, water, pensions, etc.); payment of "taxes" to warrior organizations; discriminatory hiring practices; weakening private market forces by working through war economies.</p> <p>In the mid-1990s, many international actors sought to strengthen the economic security of Russia as a means of reducing instability in a country of war-prone regions. One particular area of activity was the re-writing of Russia's bankruptcy laws. By forcing companies that had been ignoring their creditors to finally pay their debts, the new legislation led to big increase in bankruptcies -- which rose to 11,000 in 1999 from 4,300 in 1997. With weak, money-losing companies out of the market, analysts hoped that the Russian economy would become more competitive and "robust.". Instead, powerful politicians and "businessmen" (some with murky links to organized crime) often had their cronies named as court-appointed managers of troubled companies, allowing them to take over some of the firms and strip them of any prize assets, thereby contributing to economic <i>insecurity</i>, rather than security. (<i>Maclean's</i>, 20 May 2002, p. 65)</p>
		SAMPLE INDICATORS*	
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dependence on war economies (e.g., use of black market; reliance on (para) military employment)</li> <li>• # of jobs created in non-military related sectors</li> <li>• Ratio of military expenditure to social expenditures by state</li> <li>• Pre- versus post-conflict export (and investment) levels</li> <li>• Level of economic control by local or national actors for local or national interests</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National unemployment rate versus rate among vulnerable populations (ex-combatants, returnee and displaced populations, war-disabled, widows, youth, war-affected regions)</li> <li>• Dependence on external assistance</li> </ul>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Availability of basic goods to all communities</li> <li>• Personal savings rates</li> <li>• Regional and national inflation rates</li> <li>• Strength of foreign currency</li> <li>• # and size of new businesses</li> </ul>

(These indicators may or may not apply to specific cases. Quantitative and qualitative indicators should be developed. Communities should have complete latitude to identify indicators that make sense to them and their realities)

AREAS OF POTENTIAL PEACE & CONFLICT IMPACT		EXAMPLES			
		 PEACE IMPACT	 CONFLICT IMPACT		
5	Social Empowerment	<p>A project in Haiti to reconstruct the police force specifically recruited from communities which had suffered rights abuses, because it was felt that they were most sensitive to the need to protect and promote such rights.</p> <p>Mentoring relationships between urban planning professional across inter-group boundaries in Bosnia Herzegovina supported the development not only technical capacities, but inter-group communication and understanding as well.</p>	<p>It is increasingly common to "consult" with communities before launching an initiative (sometimes this is the first and only time of contact). To the extent that these meetings accept and work through the existing social power structure, then they may reinforce social inequities and tensions. For example, authority structures which dis-empower women, or certain social or economic groups.</p>		
		<p><b>SAMPLE INDICATORS*</b></p> <table border="1"> <tr> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sense of local ownership over peace processes</li> <li>• Levels of tolerance/ distrust within cultural, social, ethnic, political, religious organizations</li> <li>• Level and type of social interactions between groups</li> <li>• Levels of inter-marriage</li> <li>• Levels of bilingualism (where language is a political issue)</li> <li>• Level of participation by "marginalized" or "dis-empowered" groups (women, the poor, the disenfranchised)</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• # of cross-cutting cultural or social organizations;</li> <li>• Inclusive/ exclusive schooling system</li> <li>• Adult and children's perceptions of other groups/ levels of Stereotyping; Role of the media/ levels of censorship</li> <li>• Levels of trust between groups</li> <li>• Rejection of a gun culture/ militarized culture (glorification military violence)</li> <li>• # of locally-initiated and run peacebuilding initiatives</li> </ul> </td> <td> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of dependence on outside support in conflict resolution and peacebuilding</li> <li>• Number of families dislocated by conflict</li> <li>• Number of families with at least one member who is "missing"</li> <li>• Levels of "trauma" within communities and degree to which it interferes with normal activities. Effectiveness of responses to this trauma.</li> <li>• Suicide rates (who? Where? Why?)</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sense of local ownership over peace processes</li> <li>• Levels of tolerance/ distrust within cultural, social, ethnic, political, religious organizations</li> <li>• Level and type of social interactions between groups</li> <li>• Levels of inter-marriage</li> <li>• Levels of bilingualism (where language is a political issue)</li> <li>• Level of participation by "marginalized" or "dis-empowered" groups (women, the poor, the disenfranchised)</li> </ul>
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## GLOSSARY

**Development Industry:** refers to organizations, projects, and programs that treat development as a business, and as a result, lose sight of the human realities and consequences of their work. The Development Industry is based on:

- short-term/temporary rather than long-term interventions
- absence rather than presence
- “product” rather than “process”
- external control rather than internal control
- efficiency rather than effectiveness
- predictability rather than indeterminacy
- Linearity rather than non-linearity
- mechanistic, recipe book approaches rather than organic, learning approaches
- pre-programmed rather than responsive approaches
- routine, boring approaches rather than creative approaches
- anonymity rather than friendship and relationship building
- checklists rather than stories
- budgets rather than people

**Disempower/ Dis-empowerment:** An individual or community is “disempowered” when it is unable to participate in decisions that affect their lives and livelihoods, and when they lack the means to assert their rights — or have those means taken away.

**Interpretation:** “Facts” never speak for themselves. An event, an action, a statement, all require us to “make sense” of them. For example, in the worksheets in this handbook, you were asked to identify “indicators.” These may *describe* something, but they do not *explain* them. “Interpretation” is the process we use (1) to identify which events, actions, and statements are “important,” and (2) to understand and explain them.

**Mainstream:** “Mainstreaming” refers to the process by which ideas are *integrated* into the culture, operations, and objectives of a organization. By “integrated,” we mean non-removable and central to all aspects of an organizations work. So, for example, in the case of gender, this would apply to organizations that consider gender in every dimension of its work from personnel policies (maternity/paternity leave, daycare, breast-feeding policies, affirmative action, promotion and training policies) to programming decisions and evaluation (being sensitive to gender impacts of its normal work). But, it would not apply to organizations that segregate gender issues in poorly funded and understaffed units with no chance of affecting the way the organization does its work.

**Militarized violence:** The term ‘militarized violence’ is used rather than ‘war’ because it conveys a more accurate sense of the nature of contemporary violent conflict. While it includes conventional military engagements between organized forces of war, it also encompasses the full spectrum of abuses that defines ‘dirty wars’ around the world perpetrated by (primarily, though not exclusively) men, in or out of a uniform. It thus includes control through terror and the manipulation of fear, the systematic abuse of human rights, and a totalizing process by which all social, political, and economic problems come to be defined as military problems—and, as military problems, the most suitable response is deemed automatically to be the application of the weapons of war.

## Referents in the Evolution of the idea of PCIA

1996

- "Good Practices for the PCIA of Development Projects," CIDA Discussion Paper, OECD DAC Taskforce on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, Paris, 16-17 September. Prepared by Kenneth Bush.
- "Local Capacities for Peace Project" launched by Mary Anderson's Collaborative for Development Action, Boston.
- Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons From the Rwanda Experience*, 5 vols. Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, Copenhagen (March)

1997

- *Evaluation of Norwegian Assistance to Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Mozambique*, Astri Suhrke et al., Christian Michelsen Institute/ Nordic Consulting Group, Bergen, Norway.
- "Conflict Reduction Through British Cooperation," DIFD, London.

1998

- *A Measure of Peace: PCIA of Development Projects in War Zones*, Kenneth Bush, International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada [http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working\\_paper1.html](http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working_paper1.html)
- Workshop: "Do No Harm Meets PCIA," IDRC.
- *OECD DAC Guidelines on Conflict Peace and Development Cooperation on the Threshold of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Paris. <http://www.oecd.org/dac>
- *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Matrix of Analytical Tools Available Internationally for Peacebuilding and Donor Coordination*, CIDA Peacebuilding Unit.

1998

- "Programming for Results in Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities in Setting Performance Indicators," Anne-Marie Laprise, CIDA, Hull, Canada, May.
- "Tugal" Capacity Building Exercise. IDRC

1999

- *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War*, Mary Anderson, Lynne Rienner, Boulder and London
- *The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Cooperation Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations* (with Case Studies on Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Bosnia & Afghanistan)
- "Strategic Conflict Analysis and Conflict Impact Assessment," Michael Warner, Robert Walker, and Robert Scharf, DFID, London, August.

2000

- *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Cooperation with ACP Countries*, Manuela Leonhardt, International Alert and Safer World, London
- *Assessment of Lessons Learned from Sida Support to Conflict Management and Peacebuilding*, 3 Vols., Sida Dept for Coordination with NGOs and Humanitarian Assistance. Stockholm, Sweden. <http://www.sida.se/evaluation>

2002

- The Berghof Debates on PCIA: *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001). <http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/cf.htm>

2002

- *Conducting Conflict Assessments: Guidance Notes*, DFID, London. <http://www.dfid.gov.uk>

2002

- *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions: Framing the State of Play*, INCORE <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/publication/research/index.html>

2003

- "Looking at Conflict In the Eye: Community-Based Mapping and Impact Assessment," Training Conference for Local Resource Partners of the Philippines-Canada Local Government Support Program (LGSP), Davao, January.
- "Good Practices by Local Governments in Peace and Unity – Case Studies and Tools," Federation of Local Municipalities, Ottawa, Canada (with case studies from Palestine, Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Philippines.)

## References

- Anderson (1999), Mary, *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace -- or War* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner).
- Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management (2001). *Berghof Hand Book for Conflict Transformation*. Section on PCIA. Contributors are: Mark Hoffman, Kenneth Bush, Manuela Leonhardt, Christoph Feyen, Hans Gsaenger, Marc Howard Ross and Jay Rothman. <http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook>
- Bush, Kenneth (2001). "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: The Commodification of an Idea," *The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* (Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2001). Html [www.berghof-center.org/handbook/bush/](http://www.berghof-center.org/handbook/bush/)
- (2000). "Polio, War, and Peace," *Bulletin of the World Health Organizations: The International Journal of Public Health*, 78(3). <http://www.who.int/bulletin>
- , A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, *Working Paper #1*, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998). [http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working\\_paper1.html](http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working_paper1.html)
- (1996). "Good Practices for the PCIA of Development Projects," CIDA Discussion Paper, OECD DAC Taskforce on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, Paris, 16-17 September.
- COWI (1997). *Evaluation of Norwegian Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan – Evaluation Report 11.97* (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- Guest, Iain, "Misplaced Charity Undermines Kosovo's Self-Reliance," The Overseas Development Council, February 2000. <http://www.odc.org/commentary/vpfeb00.html>
- Natsios, Andrew (1997). "An NGO Perspective," in I. William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, eds., *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques* (Washington, D.C.: US Institute for Peace). Pp. 337-364.

St. Paul University  
MA in Conflict Studies

ECS 5330  
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)  
of Interventions in Conflict-Prone Settings

Previous Title: Conflict Resolution: Results Assessment (KB)  
ECS 5730 Résolution des conflits: résultats et évaluation (KB)

Instructor: Professor Kenneth Bush  
Office: Rm 271  
Tel: 236-1393 x 2341

Fall 2004  
Class Room: 154  
e-mail: [kbush@ustpaul.ca](mailto:kbush@ustpaul.ca)

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"You tell me your indicators, and I'll tell you what you'll find."

This course focuses on a new and evolving area of research and practice: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA). PCIA is a means of anticipating/ monitoring/ and evaluating the ways in which an intervention in a violence-prone setting may affect/ is affecting/or has affected, the dynamics of peace or conflict. The term "intervention" is used in its broadest sense to include, for example, initiatives that are intended to have beneficial impacts on levels of social developmental, humanitarian conditions, economic development, or peace & security. PCIA is a process similar to Gender Analysis and Environmental Impact Assessment in that it is concerned with impacts beyond the stated outputs, outcomes, and objectives of an initiative.

This course sets PCIA (as well as related and derivative methodologies) within the context of the animated *and very political* debate over how we work in conflict-prone regions, and how we should understand and assess that work.

- This reading list will evolve over the course of the semester. Changes or additions will be announced in class and posted on the instructors office door.
- Readings for each week will be identified in the preceding class.

#### A WORD ABOUT WORDS

**PEACE AND CONFLICT IMPACT ASSESSMENT ("PCIA")** is a means of assessing the ways in which an intervention may affect, is affecting, or has affected, the dynamics of peace or conflict in a violence-prone setting. PCIA focuses on: 1) **Peacebuilding Impact** -- those factors that strengthen the chances for peace and decrease the chances that violent conflict will breakout, continue, or start again, and; 2) **Conflict-Creating Impact** -- those factors that increase the chances that conflict will be dealt with through the use of violence. (Bush 1998).

*PCIA is a process, not an add-on or a single-use "tool".*

**PEACEBUILDING** consists of two inseparable parts: (1) the **construction of the structures of peace**, and (2) the **deconstruction of the structures of violence**. It is not about the imposition of solutions, but the creation of space within which indigenous actors can identify problems and formulate their own solutions.

**IMPACT** refers to the actual effects of an intervention – both intended and unintended – on the lives of its "beneficiaries" and others *beyond the immediate project outputs* (e.g., # of wells dug, # of people trained, people serviced, and so on). In popular usage, "effect" and "result" is sometimes used in stead of impact.

**CONFLICT** is not necessarily negative or destructive. **Problems arise when non-violent conflict turns (or re-turns) violent.** Violent conflict is neither *sui generis* nor spontaneous. The "surprise" about the violent conflict is not that it occurs, but that we watch it develop for so long, and do nothing about it – evident, for example in: the disintegration of governments and the rule of law; increasing human rights abuses; the imposition of conflict-generating terms of trade or economic conditionalities; the acceptance of (or participation in) corrupt business practices; the selling of weapons to illegitimate and violent regimes, *etc.*

**DEVELOPMENT** is inevitably **conflictual**, destabilizing, and (ultimately) subversive because it challenges existing political, economic, and social power structures that stop individuals and groups from attaining their full potential.

## COURSE REQUIREMENTS

### Grading

## Seminar Presentations (20%)

The general format for each class will be an preliminary discussion of the week's topic by the instructor, followed by presentations of the assigned readings by individual seminar participants. The presentations should answer the following questions:

- **So What?** What is the principal point/argument/thesis of the reading? Why was it written? Was it responding to particular issues/ arguments/ events?
- **Is it proven?** How is the reading structured to make its point? What theoretical or empirical material is employed? Are you convinced? Would the book benefit from additional research, expansion, condensation or omission? Has it missed anything that might strengthen or weaken its argument? What would you challenge or change?
- **Now what?** Your comments and reflections on the implication of the reading. How might it be "used." What are the next steps that follow from the reading practically, or theoretically -- implicitly or explicitly?

Presentations (of no more than fifteen minutes) should represent the arguments of the author(s) accurately and fairly, while also provoking and stimulating discussion. Presenters should come prepared to set out an agenda for discussion of the assigned readings. The agenda should reflect the key ideas in the readings, controversies, points of clarification.

## Class Participation (20%)

The following matrix will help to identify the types of student interventions which will be the basis for the participation grade

<b>STRIKE</b> Off the Mark	<b>REITERATIVE</b> Supporting or echoing a point that has been made	<b>DESCRIPTIVE</b> Bringing in a point from a reading	<b>INTEROGATIVE</b> Questioning a point in a readings/ or discussion	<b>ANALYTICAL/ CRITICAL</b> Challenging a point from a reading/ or discussion
<b>CRITICAL-EMPIRICAL</b> Drawing on empirical evidence supporting/ challenging a point in a reading/discussion	<b>COMPARATIVE/ INTEGRATIVE</b> Comparing or connecting points in single reading	<b>COMPARATIVE/ INTEGRATIVE</b> Comparing or connecting points in different readings	<b>CREATIVE/ INTERPRETIVE</b> Reinterpretation of a point in a reading/ or discussion	<b>SEERING A-HA</b> Novel insight

## Mid-Term Assignment (30%) -- DUE 3 NOV

Critical Literature Review: Approximate length of assignment: 12-15 pages. Details to be presented in class.

## Final Assignment (30%) – DUE 9 DEC

An assessment of the Peace and Conflict Impact (potential or actual) of an intervention, selected in consultation with the instructor

## Participation and Preparation

Attendance is mandatory. The instructor should be notified directly if a student is unable to attend a class. Students are expected to arrive on time for each class. Active student participation is essential to the success of the class. Thus, students are expected to:

- have read the assigned material before the class and
- be able to *actively* and *critically* engage the central issues in the readings -- whether or not they are formally presenting a reading or set of readings in class. This may include being asked to respond to specific questions on specific readings during the class.

## COURSE DEADLINES

- 1) Mid-Term Assignment/ Critical Literature Review: DUE Nov 3rd
- 2) Final Assignment: 9 December

## WEEK ONE: INTRODUCTION

No assigned Readings

## WEEK TWO: POLITICS OF, IN, AND AROUND EVALUATION

Colin Knox, "Political Context and Program Evaluation: The Inextricable Link," *The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation* 11:1 (1996), pp. 1-20.

Kenneth Bush, "The Commodification, Compartmentalization and Militarization of Peacebuilding," in Keating and Knight (eds), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo & Edmonton: UN University Press and U of Alberta Press, 2004), 23-46

Ernest House, *The Logic of Evaluative Argument*, CSE Monograph Series in Evaluation No. 7 (Centre for the Study of Evaluation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977).

Chelimsky, E. (1995) 'The Political Environment of Evaluation and What it Means for the Development of the Field', *Evaluation Practice*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 215-25. (x)

Estrella, M. and J. Gaventa (1998) *Who Counts Reality? Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation: A Literature Review*, IDS Working Paper 70. (x)

Guba, E. and Y. Lincoln (1989) *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. London: Sage Publications. (x)

## WEEK THREE: WHAT IS EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT?

Louisa Gosling (w. Mike Edwards), *TOOLKITS: A practical Guide to Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation* (London: Save the Children UK, 1996)

→ Chapter One: "The Use of Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation in Programme Design and Management," pp. 11-14.

→ Chapter Six: "Assessment and Programme Planning," pp. 66-80.

→ Chapter Eight: "Review and Evaluation," pp. 98-114

Mark Schacter, *Means... Ends... Indicators: Performance Measurement in the Public Sector*, Institute on Governance Policy Brief No. 3, April 1999, pp. 1-5 <http://www.iog.ca/publications/policybrief3.pdf>

Coralie Bryant and Louise G. White, "Data Collection, Monitoring and Evaluation," *Managing Development in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 135-153.

Roberto Mosse and Leigh Ellen Sontheimer, *Performance Monitoring Indicators Handbook*, World Bank Technical Paper No. 334 (Washington, DC: The World Bank 1996)

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- Manuela Leonhardt, "Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA?"
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- Marc Howard Ross, "PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool"
- Jay Rothman, "Action Evaluation: A Response to Mark Hoffman's Comments"

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ECS 5730  
Résolution des conflits: résultats et évaluation  
« l'évaluation d'impact sur les situations de la paix et de conflit (EIPC) »

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Ce cours offrira une présentation et une discussion de plusieurs approches employées dans l'analyse et l'évaluation d'initiatives qui sont situées dans les zones de conflits militarisées.

Dans l'établissement d'un Cadre pour l'édification et la consolidation de la paix, il faut reconnaître d'emblée que les initiatives (locale, nationale, et internationale) exerce une influence sur la dynamique de la paix et des conflits et qu'il est lui-même influencé par cette dynamique. L'objectif premier de la cour est de mieux saisir comment ces initiatives peuvent jouer un rôle dans l'édification de la paix et d'apprendre comment le renforcement des capacités des acteurs dans les zones prédisposées aux conflits peu éviter la violence tout en contribuant à la paix et à l'unité.

La pierre angulaire du cours est l'évaluation d'impact sur les situations de la paix et de conflit (EIPC) [Anglais : Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment/ PCIA] : un moyen d'anticiper, de surveiller et d'évaluer comment une intervention peut influencer ou a influencée la dynamique de la paix dans une région susceptible de connaître des conflits. L'EIPC est un processus à multiples facettes, semblable à l'analyse comparative entre les sexes et à l'étude d'impact sur l'environnement, qui facilite la détermination et la compréhension de l'impact d'une initiative sur la paix ou un conflit. L'EIPC peut être appliquée dans un large éventail de zones prédisposées aux conflits, c'est-à-dire dans des endroits où il existe un risque qu'un conflit non-violent devienne violent.

## ORGANISATION

Le cours sera composé de 12 sessions en classe de trois heures chacune (sauf l'introduction). Les absences non-justifiées au cours seront pénalisées. Le professeur introduira le sujet de la semaine et une discussion sur les textes au programme suivra. Chaque texte sera présenté par un étudiant.

Les étudiants devront faire les lectures obligatoires à chaque semaine, parce qu'ils seront évalués sur (1) leurs présentations et (2) leurs contributions aux discussions.

## ÉVALUATION

### (1) Participation en classe (20%)

La note de participation sera basée sur la quantité et la qualité des interventions des étudiants au cours des discussions sur les textes obligatoires – salon la matrix suivant:

<b>STRIKE</b> Off the Mark	<b>REITERATIVE</b> Supporting or echoing a point that has been made in class or in reading	<b>DESCRIPTIVE</b> Bringing in a point from a reading in a descriptive fashion	<b>INTEROGATIVE</b> Questioning a point in a readings/ or discussion	<b>ANALYTICAL/ CRITICAL</b> Challenging/ analyzing/ assessing a point from a reading/ or discussion
<b>CRITICAL-EMPIRICAL</b> Use of empirical evidence (examples) to support or challenge a point in a reading or discussion	<b>COMPARATIVE/ INTEGRATIVE</b> Comparing or connecting points in different readings/ discussions		<b>CREATIVE/ INTERPRETIVE</b> Reinterpretation of a point in a reading/ or discussion. Recontextualizing	<b>SEERING A-HA</b> Novel insight

## (2) Présentations (20%)

Les présentations doivent couvrir un des thèmes ou sous-thèmes d'un texte..  
Les présentations doivent répondre à des questions suivantes :

- **So What?** What is the principal point/argument/thesis of the reading? Why was it written? Was it responding to particular issues/ arguments/ events? Pourquoi?
- **Is it proven?** How is the reading structured to make its point? What theoretical or empirical material is employed? Are you convinced? Would the book benefit from additional research, expansion, condensation or omission? Has it missed anything that might strengthen or weaken its argument? What would you challenge or change?
- **Now what?** Your comments and reflections on the implication of the reading. How might it be "used." What are the next steps that follow from the reading practically, or theoretically -- implicitly or explicitly?

Presentations (of no more than fifteen minutes) should represent the arguments of the author(s) accurately and fairly, while also provoking and stimulating discussion. Presenters should come prepared to set out an agenda for discussion of the assigned readings. The agenda should reflect the key ideas in the readings, controversies, points of clarification.

**Les étudiants devront rédiger des comptes-rendus-rendus pour chacune de leurs présentations.** Les compte-rendus devront compter de 2 pages (pas plus).

## (3) Les compte-rendus de lecture (30%)

Les compte-rendus de lecture doivent consister en une discussion approfondie d'au moins 5 textes qui ne sont pas au programme des lectures obligatoires. Les compte-rendus devront compter de 12-15 pages (pas plus).

## (4) Final Assignment (30%)

Utilisation des outils de l'EIPC/ PCIA sur un projet qui est choisi par l'étudiant et la professeur.

## CALENDRIER ET LECTURES<sup>1</sup>

### PREMIÈRE PARTIE : LE CONTEXTE

#### SESSION 1: INTRODUCTION AU COURS

#### SESSION 2: LE CONTEXTE POLITIQUE

✘ Michael Small, « L'édification de la paix dans les sociétés, après le conflit, » Rob McRae et Don Hubert, *Sécurité Humaine et Nouvelle Diplomatie*(Montréal & Kingston, London, Ithaca : McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001)pp. 84-

Don Hubert et Michael Bonser, « Intervention militaire à caractère humanitaire, » Rob McRae et Don Hubert, *Sécurité Humaine et Nouvelle Diplomatie*(Montréal & Kingston, London, Ithaca : McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001)pp. 84-

✘ Rob McRae, "La sécurité humaine dans le contexte de la mondialisation, » Rob McRae et Don Hubert, *Sécurité Humaine et Nouvelle Diplomatie*(Montréal & Kingston, London, Ithaca : McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001) 15-29

Commission internationale de l'intervention et de la souveraineté des États (CIISE).

<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Rapport-de-la-Commission.pdf>

#### SESSION 3: POLITICS OF, IN, AND AROUND EVALUATION

- ✘ Kenneth Bush, "The Commodification, Compartmentalization and Militarization of Peacebuilding," in Keating and Knight (eds), *Building Sustainable Peace* (Tokyo & Edmonton: UN University Press and U of Alberta Press, 2004), 23-46olin
- ✘ Knox, "Political Context and Program Evaluation: The Inextricable Link," *The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation* 11:1 (1996), pp. 1-20.

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1. Il est possible que le professeur ajoute certaines lectures obligatoires pendant la session. Les autres sources sont offertes à titre indicatif et ne peuvent pas être considérées comme une bibliographie suffisante pour préparer les compte-rendus de lecture .

Roméo Dallaire, *J'ai serré la main du Diable: La Faillite de l'humanité au Rwanda* (Paris : Libre Expression, 2003) 13 : Comptabilité d'un massacre , pp. 471-524

Ernest House, *The Logic of Evaluative Argument*, CSE Monograph Series in Evaluation No. 7 (Centre for the Study of Evaluation, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977).

Chelimsky, E. (1995) 'The Political Environment of Evaluation and What it Means for the Development of the Field', *Evaluation Practice*, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 215-25.

Estrella, M. and J. Gaventa (1998) *Who Counts Reality? Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation: A Literature Review*, IDS Working Paper 70.

Guba, E. and Y. Lincoln (1989) *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. London: Sage Publications.

#### SESSION 4: LES NOTIONS ELEMENTAIRES

\* ACDI, *Guide de l'évaluations à l'ACDI: Comment faire une évaluation*. Version Provisoire (Hull : ACDI, January 2000)  
→ [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Performancereview5/\\$file/GuideEval.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Performancereview5/$file/GuideEval.pdf)

Chapitre 1 : Introduction & Les Notions Élémentaires (1-12)  
Chapitre 2 : L'accent à Mettre sur les Résultats (13-20)  
Chapitre 3 : Le Contexte Particulier aux évaluations (21-26)  
Chapitre 4 : Répondre aux attentes (27-32)  
Chapitre 5 : Développer la capacité d'évaluer l'investissement (33-36)  
Chapitre 6 : Les règles à observer (37-40)  
Chapitre 10 : La collecte et analyse des données

ACDI, *Comment faire une évaluation -- Les brochures/ Évaluation étape par étape -- un complément au Guide de l'évaluations à l'ACDI* (Hull : ACDI, 2000)  
→ [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/0E6C745CBE0E662D85256C5000592275?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/0E6C745CBE0E662D85256C5000592275?OpenDocument)

Louisa Gosling (w. Mike Edwards), *TOOLKITS: A practical Guide to Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation* (London: Save the Children UK, 1996) → Chapter One: "The Use of Assessment, Monitoring, Review and Evaluation in Programme Design and Management," pp. 11-14. → Chapter Six: "Assessment and Programme Planning," pp. 66-80. → Chapter Eight: "Review and Evaluation," pp. 98-114

Mark Schacter, *Means... Ends... Indicators: Performance Measurement in the Public Sector*, Institute on Governance Policy Brief No. 3, April 1999, pp. 1-5 <http://www.iog.ca/publications/policybrief3.pdf>

Coralie Bryant and Louise G. White, "Data Collection, Monitoring and Evaluation," *Managing Development in the Third World* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 135-153.

Roberto Mosse and Leigh Ellen Sontheimer, *Performance Monitoring Indicators Handbook*, World Bank Technical Paper No. 334 (Washington, DC: The World Bank 1996)

Earle, L. (2003) *Lost in the Matrix: The Logframe and the Local Picture*.

#### SESSION 5: METHODOLOGIE – Le Cadre logique

\* ACDI, *Guide de la GR sur l'établissement de chaînes de résultats : Les principes de base de la GR appliqués à 100 exemples de projets* (Hull : ACDI, 2000) [Populaire] [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/B7B097C7426FD4A985256C62001AB9ED?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/B7B097C7426FD4A985256C62001AB9ED?OpenDocument)

→ en anglais: CIDA, *RBM Handbook on Developing Results Chains: The Basics of RBM as Applied to 100 Projects*, Results-Based Management Division (Hull: CIDA, 2000)  
[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Performancereview6/\\$file/Full\\_report.pdf](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/INET/IMAGES.NSF/vLUIImages/Performancereview6/$file/Full_report.pdf)

ACDI, *La gestion axée sur les résultats à l'ACDI: Guide d'introduction aux concepts et aux principes*, Direction de la gestion axée sur les résultats, Direction générale de l'examen du rendement, Janvier 1999 [Académique]  
[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/53B2EDE81CCFF0CC85256C6B001A8E7C?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/53B2EDE81CCFF0CC85256C6B001A8E7C?OpenDocument)

→ en anglais: CIDA, *Results-Based Management in CIDA: An Introductory Guide to the Concepts and Principles* -- Results-Based Management Division, Performance Review Branch . January 1999 [http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/B83025BCF2DA296785256C6B001A1B36?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/B83025BCF2DA296785256C6B001A1B36?OpenDocument)

\* ACDI, *Le Cadre logique : L'Orienter vers le succès* (Hull : ACDI, 1997)

[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/E47EA42F83A4277A85256C62001E69F0?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/E47EA42F83A4277A85256C62001E69F0?OpenDocument)

→ en anglais: ACIDI, The Logical Framework: Making it Results-Oriented (Hull: ACIDI, 1997)  
[http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida\\_ind.nsf/vall/C36EBD571B6FA02985256C620066CD6F?OpenDocument](http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/C36EBD571B6FA02985256C620066CD6F?OpenDocument)

CIDA, *Guide to Gender-Sensitive Indicators* (Hull: CIDA, 1997)

CIDA, *A Project Level Handbook – The Why and How of Gender-Sensitive Indicators* (Hull: CIDA, 1997)

Alan Fowler, "Assessing Development Impact and Organizational Performance," in his *Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NGOs in International Development* ((London: Earthscan, 1997), pp. 160-183.

INTRAC (1999) 'Evaluating Impact: The Search for Appropriate Methods and Instruments', *Intrac*, no. 12.

INTRAC (2001) *NGOs and Impact Assessment*. NGO Policy Briefing Paper No 3. Oxford: INTRAC.

CIDA, *Guide to Project Performance Reporting: For Canadian Partners and Executing Agencies* (Hull: CIDA, May 1999).

Uma Kothari, *Developing Guidelines for Assessing Achievement in the Eight Focal Areas of Social Development Work and For Assessing Outcomes – Assessment Procedures*, SD SCOPE Paper No. 10, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester, January 2000.

## SESSION 6: L'INFLUENCE DE L'AIDE DANS DES SITUATIONS SITUATIONS DE CONFLITS VIOLENT

Jean Deaudelin, "Entre la peur et les Bonnes Intentions: Sécurité Humaine et Aide au Développement au Canada," Jean-Francois Rioux, *La Sécurité Humaine : Un Nouvelle Conception des relations des Relations Internationales* (Paris : Harmattan, 2001).< pp. 301-320

✘ Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., Do No Harm/ Local Capacities for Peace Project, "Indications for Assessment Aid's Impact on Conflict." (1999?)  
[http://WWW.CDAINC.COM/dnh/archives/2001/07/indications\\_for\\_assessing\\_aids\\_impacts\\_on\\_conflict.php](http://WWW.CDAINC.COM/dnh/archives/2001/07/indications_for_assessing_aids_impacts_on_conflict.php)

Kenneth Bush, "Good Practices for the PCIA of Development Projects," CIDA Discussion Paper, OECD DAC Taskforce on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, Paris, 16-17 September, 1996

### *Internationale*

✘ Peter Uvin, « L'influence de l'aide dans des situations situations de conflits violent, » OCDE, Comité d'Aide au Développement (CAD), Groupe d'étude informel du CAD sur les conflits, la paix et la coopération pour le développement, Paris, September 1999.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/59/18280198.pdf>

Mary Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace -- or War* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1999).

### *Local*

✘ Kenneth Bush, Le renforcement des capacités, gage de paix et d'unité: Le rôle du gouvernement local dans la consolidation de la paix (Ottawa : Fédération canadienne des municipalités, 2004) → Introduction, Conclusion, et Annexes. pp. 1-15 & 51-58 ET  
→ Études de cas sure la gouvernance local et la consolidation de la paix :

- Bosnie-Herzégovine
- Territoires Palestiniens
- Mindanao, Philippines (Zones de paix)
- Mindanao, Philippines (Genpeace)

[http://www.icmd-cidm.ca/file\\_download.php?URL\\_ID=2984&filename=10791244541Peace\\_FR.pdf&filetype=application%2Fpdf&filesize=897083&name=Peace\\_FR.pdf&location=user-S/](http://www.icmd-cidm.ca/file_download.php?URL_ID=2984&filename=10791244541Peace_FR.pdf&filetype=application%2Fpdf&filesize=897083&name=Peace_FR.pdf&location=user-S/)

David Nyheim, Manuela Leonhardt, and Cynthia Gaigals, *Development in Conflict: A Seven Step Tool for Planners* (Version 1) (London: FEWER, International Alert, Saferworld, 2001).

Milton Esman, *Can Foreign Aid Moderate Ethnic Conflict?* Peaceworks No. 13, US Institute for Peace, March 1997.

Jonathan Goodhand with Philippa Atkinson, *Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement* (London: International Alert, 2001)

Haneef Atmar & Jonathan Goodhand, *Aid, Conflict and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: What Lessons Can be Learned* (London: International Alert, 2002).

Dfid, "Conflict Reduction Through British Cooperation," DIFD, London.

OECD DAC, *The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Cooperation Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations* (with Case Studies on Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Bosnia & Afghanistan) (Paris: OECD DAC, 1999)

### **Peace Through Health**

World Health Organization Europe and DFID, *WHO/DFID Peace Through Health Programme: A Case Study Prepared by the WHO Field Team in Bosnia Herzegovina* (Principal Author: Gregory Hess), Partnerships in Health and Emergency Assistance. EUR/ICP/CORD 030501. WHO Copenhagen, 1999.

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[http://www.who.int/disasters/hbp/general/Inventory\\_of\\_hbp.pdf](http://www.who.int/disasters/hbp/general/Inventory_of_hbp.pdf)

Health as a Bridge to Peace Bibliography: [http://www.who.int/disasters/hbp/general/hbp\\_bibliography.htm](http://www.who.int/disasters/hbp/general/hbp_bibliography.htm)  
Richard Gant and Steve Durrant, Microfinance in Conflict Assessment Process (MICAP), "A Guide for Those Involved in Microfinance in Areas Affected by Conflict in Sri Lanka" prepared for GTZ and SIDA, Colombo, Sri Lanka July 2004.

Bush and Robert Opp, "Alternative Approaches to Conflict Management: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment and Community-Based Natural Resource Management" in Daniel Buckles (ed.), *Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management* (Ottawa/ Washington, D.C.: International Development Research Centre/The World Bank, 1999).  
Electronic Version: [http://www.idrc.ca/ninga/conflict/cases\\_e.html](http://www.idrc.ca/ninga/conflict/cases_e.html)

David Gordon, Thomas Homer-Dixon, Princeton Lyman, Millicent Obaso, Andrew Price-Smith, *Current Issues Transcript – Plague Upon Plague: AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa* (Washington: US Institute for Peace, 2001).

US Institute for Peace, *Special Report: AIDS and Violent Conflict in Africa* (Washington: USIP, 2001) [www.usip.org](http://www.usip.org) 15 October 2001

### **Reconstruction**

Alcira Kreimer, John Eriksson, Robert Muscat, Margaret Arnold, and Colin Scott, *The World Bank's Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction*, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED), 1998

World Bank, *The World Bank's Experience with Post-conflict Reconstruction (In Five Volumes)*, Report No. 17769 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (OED), May 4, 1998). Volume I: Synthesis Report; Volume II: Bosnia and Herzegovina Case Study; Volume III: El Salvador Case Study; Volume IV: Uganda Case Study; Volume V: Desk Reviews of Cambodia, Eritrea, Haiti, Lebaon, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka.

→ to be read in conjunction with: (1) Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents* (London: Penguin, 2002), John Pilger, *The New Rulers of the World* (London: Verso, 2002), "Introduction," pp. 1-15, and "The Model Pupil," 17-46 ; and Greg Palast, *The Best Democracy Money Can Buy* (London: Robinson, 2002), "Chapter Four. Sell the Lexus , Burn the Olive Tree," pp141-204

Chapman, J. (2003) *System Failure: Why Governments Must Learn to Think Differently*. London: DEMOS.

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## **SESSION 7: L'ÉVALUATION D'IMPACT SUR LES SITUATIONS DE LA PAIX ET DE CONFLIT (EIPC) [Anglais : Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment/ PCIA]**

✦ Bush, *Hands-On PCIA: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment* (Manila: Local Governance Support Programme, 2003) <http://action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/Hands-On%20PCIA%20-%20Handbook%20X%20-%20BUSH%20Final%20Author%5C%27s%20Version1.pdf> [Updated version to be distributed to students electronically]

Bush, A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones, *Working Paper #1*, (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1998). [http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working\\_paper1.html](http://www.idrc.ca/peace/p1/working_paper1.html)

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International Institute for Sustainable Development, Impact du programme d'appui de l'élevage (PASEL) sur la paix et les conflits, Novembre 2002. [www.iisd.org](http://www.iisd.org)

## SESSION 8 : LES DEBATS DE BERGHOF

✦ Alexander Austin, Martina Fischer & Oliver Wils (eds.), *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Critical Views on Theory and Practice*, Berghof HandBook Dialogue Series (Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 2003).  
<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/complete.htm>

- Martina Fischer & Oliver Wils, "Ploughing Through the Field: An Introduction to the PCIA Handbook Debate."
- Mark Hoffman, "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Evolving Art Form or Practical Dead-End"
- Kenneth Bush, "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Five Years On: The Commodification of an Idea"
- Manuela Leonhardt, "Towards a Unified Methodology: Reframing PCIA?"
- Christoph Feyen and Hans Gsaenger, "PCIA Methodology: A Development Practitioner's Perspective"
- Marc Howard Ross, "PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool"
- Jay Rothman, "Action Evaluation: A Response to Mark Hoffman's Comments"

Thania Paffenholz, "Introducing the Peace and Conflict Assessment Model (PCA)," Draft for the Second round of PCIA Debates in the Dialogue Series of the Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. (Berlin: Berghof Foundation Version: 30 June 2004)

Swetha Rao Dhananka, *Developing a Gender-Sensitive Approach to PCIA*. MA Thesis Proposal, University of Fribourg, Switzerland.

Manuela Leonhardt, Patricia Ardon, Njeri Karuru, Andrew Sherriff, *PCIA and NGO Peacebuilding – Experiences from Kenya & Guatemala: A Briefing Paper* (London: International Alert 2002)

### *EIPC en Pratique*

Bush, "Good Practices by Local Governments in Peace and Unity – Case Studies and Tools," Federation of Local Municipalities, Ottawa, Canada (with case studies from Palestine, Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Philippines, 2004)  
[http://www.icmd-cidm.ca/file\\_download.php?URL\\_ID=2984&filename=10791239561Peace\\_ENG.pdf&filetype=application%2Fpdf&filesize=878014&name=Peace\\_ENG.pdf&location=user-S/](http://www.icmd-cidm.ca/file_download.php?URL_ID=2984&filename=10791239561Peace_ENG.pdf&filetype=application%2Fpdf&filesize=878014&name=Peace_ENG.pdf&location=user-S/)

International Institute for Sustainable Development, Impact du programme d'appui de l'élevage (PASEL) sur la paix et les conflits, Novembre 2002.

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Shirley Wouters et al., *Development of a peace and Conflict Impact Assessment for Communities in the South Caucasus*, SLE Centre for Advanced Training in Rural Development, Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Berlin 2003.

Bush, Solomon Islands Peace and Conflict Development Analysis: Emerging Priorities in Preventing Future Conflict. *UNPD-Fiji. March 2004.*

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Bush, *Peace and Conflict Impact Scan of the Government of Sri Lanka – UNICEF Country Programme of Cooperation* (Colombo, Geneva, Bradford, 2004)

## SESSION 9: "CONFLICT-SENSITIVE" PROGRAMMING

Cheyenne Church and Julie Shouldice (2002) *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions. Framing the State of Play* (INCORE: Derry/ Londonderry). <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/home/publication/research/index.html>

Cheyenne Church and Julie Shouldice (2003) *The Evaluation of Conflict Resolution Interventions. Part II Emerging Practice and Theory* (INCORE: Derry/ Londonderry)

Cynthia Gaigals (with Manuela Leonhardt), *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development, A Review of Practice* (London: Saferworld and International Alert, 2001)

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ACORD, Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, Research and Policy Programme (RAPP), "Development in Conflict Case Study: ACORD'S Programming in Gulu, Uganda," London, October 1994

## SESSION 10: SESSION: LA DÉMOCRATISATION & DROITS DE L'HOMME

### Droits De L'homme

✱ PNUD, *Rapport Mondial sur le développement humain 2000. Droits de l'homme et développement humain* Chapitre 5 : « Le rôle des indicateurs » <http://www.undp.org/hdr2000/french/book/cover.pdf>

David Beetham, *Democracy and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) Chapter 5 (Human Rights and Democracy: A Multifaceted Relationship), pp. 89-114.

Hanne Lund Madsen, *Towards Human Rights Assessments of Development Projects*, Working paper Programme of Human Rights Studies, Chr Mhr. Michelsen Institute, Dept of Social Science and Development M 1991:2,

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Kathryn English and Adam Stapleton, *The Human Rights Handbook—A Practical Guide to Monitoring Human Rights* (Capetown: Juta & Co, 1997).

David Gillies, "Evaluating National Human Rights Performance: Priorities for the Developing World," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 21, pp. 15-27. (1990).

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David Gillies, "Principled Intervention: Canadian Aid, Human Rights and the Sri Lankan Conflict" in Robert Miller (ed.), *Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1992). 33-50.

## Démocratisation & Governance

David Beetham, *Democracy and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) Chapters 1 (Defining and Justifying Democracy), 8 (Key Principles and Indices for a Democratic Audit) & 9 (Democratic Criteria for Democratic Systems).

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Russel L. Barsh, "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose," *Human Rights Quarterly*, 15:1, (1993), pp.87-121.

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Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," *Comparative Political Studies* (2002).

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**[No 1 - Les préliminaires](#)** (PDF 129 Ko, 9 pages)

Cette brochure décrit les premières étapes à franchir une fois la décision prise par la direction de faire effectuer une évaluation. Particulièrement, le cadre de référence et la sélection de l'évaluateur.

**[No 2 - Le modèle de CR](#)** (PDF 121 Ko, 13 pages) | [Texte modèle](#) (PDF 67 Ko, 11 pages)

Le modèle de CR facilite la préparation du cadre de référence. Le gestionnaire en évaluation peut s'inspirer des exemples fournis pour établir un cadre de référence satisfaisant aux exigences élémentaires de l'Agence. Il lui suffit d'adapter le texte proposé aux besoins particuliers à chacune des évaluations.

**[No 3 - L'évaluation participative](#)** (PDF 208 Ko, 9 pages)

Notre guide vous fera voir l'utilité de l'évaluation participative et les avantages à tirer de la participation des intéressés. Vous verrez quels enseignements l'Agence a tirés de l'exécution d'activités participatives, et quelles pratiques se sont révélées efficaces.

**[No 4 - L'égalité entre les sexes](#)** (PDF 213 Ko, 9 pages)

Ce guide doit aider les gestionnaires et évaluateurs de l'ACDI de même que ses partenaires à intégrer l'évaluation des résultats en matière d'égalité entre les sexes à toutes les étapes de l'évaluation. On y traite de ce que l'ACDI a appris sur la façon de s'y prendre pour connaître les progrès accomplis sur le plan de l'égalité entre les sexes et pour évaluer les résultats atteints.

**[No 5 - Le plan de travail](#)** (PDF 147 Ko, 9 pages) | [Le modèle de plan de travail](#) (PDF 242 Ko, 33 pages)

Dans ce guide, nous expliquons ce que l'ACDI attend de l'évaluateur à l'étape de la préparation de son plan de travail. Nous décrivons en détail les points à aborder, en indiquant élément par élément quels renseignements l'évaluateur doit fournir.

**[No 6 - La collecte et l'analyse des données](#)** (PDF 204 Ko, 9 pages)

Les gestionnaires de l'ACDI et leurs évaluateurs verront dans ce guide comment doivent se faire la collecte et l'analyse des données afin de faciliter la prise de décisions éclairées. Notre objectif consiste à obtenir la

meilleure valeur ajoutée possible selon les circonstances.

**[No 7 - Le rapport d'évaluation](#)** (PDF 227 Ko, 9 pages)

Ce guide aidera l'évaluateur à préparer son rapport d'évaluation. On y met l'accent sur l'importance :

- de savoir ce que l'ACDI s'attend à trouver dans ce rapport,
- d'adopter une démarche axée sur les résultats et
- de renforcer la valeur ajoutée du produit final.

**[No 8 - Le modèle de sommaire](#)** (PDF 260 Ko, 13 pages)

Savoir dire l'essentiel... C'est souvent le sommaire que les gens commencent par lire pour savoir ce que l'évaluation a permis d'apprendre. Et c'est parfois la seule partie qu'ils liront faute de temps pour lire le rapport au complet.

Un bon sommaire offre un survol du rapport d'évaluation qui renseigne bien et rapidement des auditoires clés. Les principaux éléments de l'évaluation y sont exposés de façon logique, claire et intéressante, dans un document indépendant, en tenant compte des résultats escomptés.

**[No 9 - Le modèle de résumé](#)** (PDF 166 Ko, 7 pages)

Ce guide permettra aux évaluateurs d'y trouver un modèle de résumé où abondent les conseils pour faire de bons résumés, et qui établit les attentes à combler, section par section (point de vue à adopter, contenu, niveau de détail, etc.).

**[No 10 - La communication des résultats](#)** (PDF 560 Ko, 9 pages)

Nous abordons ici la communication des résultats sous deux angles différents. Nous commençons par proposer des façons de tirer profit de l'évaluation proprement dite, pour ensuite présenter différentes méthodes de communication des résultats. L'évaluateur voit ainsi comment il doit structurer son évaluation pour ne faire une contribution à la fois utile et durable.